![]() In 2020, while retaining the core strategy of force preservation, in order to resist Chinese tactics intended to inflict attrition and pin down Taiwanese land forces, Han Kuang 36 examined the use of joint air defense battalions to protect high-value infrastructure. That year, Taiwan also explored concepts of asymmetric warfare, combined arms combat aimed at coastal denial, and civilian cooperation in communications, civil defense, and evacuation drills. In 2019, the emphasis was placed on the use of highway strips as emergency runways as a counter to China’s concentrated targeting of Taiwanese airbases with land-based missiles. Taiwan validates its operational doctrines through its annual Han Kuang Exercises.ĭuring the 2018’s Han Kuang 34, commercial drones were used for the first time by Taiwan, in addition to public SMS notifications on aerial threat warnings. However, Taiwan is counting on a joint land-sea-air attack to deliver a shock to Chinese amphibious, airborne and heliborne forces, before they are able to consolidate. This is in contradistinction from a more stable and proven practice of relying on a defense-in-depth to wear down an attack as it builds-up and pushes inland. This entails a rapid movement and concentration of land units while under interdiction, and surviving air and sea units, to contain and then counter-attack against a specific beach landing. Taiwan’s current defense framework, introduced by former Republic of China (ROC) Deputy Minister of National Defense, Admiral Lee Hsi-ming between 2016 to 2020, emphasizes force preservation, coastal victory, and beach landing denial. Recent exercises around Taiwan show that the PLA is forging ahead with an emphasis on network-centric warfare and information operations to coordinate the PLA units of its different elements, in particular between its naval platforms and aircraft. In recent months, Taiwan has become concerned about the threat value of the people’s Republic of China’s (PRC) People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF)’s top to bottom modernization that has given Beijing the ability to conduct limited anti-access and air denial (A2/AD) operations in the South China Sea, and with the potential to create a regional blockade around the island. These lessons include the importance of strategic political intelligence to avert a surprise attack, surveillance by Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), and their principal counter-measures including electronic warfare and local air defense the persisting importance of combined arms warfare, the use of precision artillery, and the exploitation of built-up terrain with light troops equipped with anti-tank systems logistics and the economic, social and political preparation for a long war. ![]() Mark Milley advised the ROC to assimilate promptly the insights from the Ukraine War. Recent Taiwanese military exercises indicate that Taipei has anticipated many of the most important lessons of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and has also been addressing issues more specific to its precarious security situation. Authored by Julian Spencer-Churchill & Liu Zongzo via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours), ![]()
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